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Abstract 
Blue economy initiatives have emerged along marine and coastal areas, seeking to bring the green 
economy into a ‘blue world’. Often defined as a global policy agenda, blue economy discourses and 
practices purportedly aim to generate ‘blue growth’ by linking poverty reduction, social equality, and 
marine conservation. While global and national policies have spent decades addressing coastal 
resource management, broader blue economy discourses and practices seem, on the surface, to 
promote economic growth strategies for marine conservation. Increasingly, new market-oriented 
programs and projects aim to tap the financial value of the ocean’s ‘blue capital’, ostensibly fostering 
income generation and sustainable solutions for conservation finance. Drawing on critical discourse 
analysis and key-informant interviews across scales, we examine the meanings and practices of the 
blue economy in Southeast Asia and in the Philippines. As an archipelagic nation, millions of coastal 
dwellers in the Philippines depend on oceans as a major source of livelihood, food security, and well-
being. We examine how multilateral institutions, bilateral organisations, state agencies, civil society 
organisations, and other key actors represent and enact the blue economy discursively and in practice. 
We find that oceans are being imagined as an open frontier that must be managed and utilised for both 
conservation and economic purposes. New territorialisation processes are creating new borders and 
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management structures that often bypass social and environmental safeguards, posing a major threat 
to coastal dwellers. We conclude that by foregrounding economic development and coastal 
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The past three decades have seen a gradual shift from state-led coastal and marine governance to 
public-private partnerships that leverage bilateral and private sector investments to fund management 
interventions in oceans globally (Abbott et al. 2014; Brent et al. 2018a; WFFP & WFF 2017, 2). 
Under the banner of ‘partnerships’, these actors and networks forge alliances among donors 
(multilateral and bilateral, including banking institutions), public agencies, civil society organisations, 
and private sector institutions (e.g., philanthropic organisations and speculative investors) to generate 
and influence global and national policy agendas in a so-called ‘blue economy’ (Barbesgaard 2018). 
On the surface, these partnerships are framed and represented as congenial, productive spaces wherein 
environmentally sustainable solutions can be forged by sharing human, financial, and material 
resources that can ultimately foster sustainable economic growth in coastal and marine spaces 
(Abrahamsen 2004). In fusing growth and sustainability, however, the nascent blue economy agenda 
is intensifying economic investment and extraction in oceans, with the potential to further exclude 
marginalised actors (Bennett 2018; Bennett et al. 2019; Cohen et al. 2019). In the blue economy, the 
governance of oceans involves their configuration as ‘frontiers’, creating boundaries and management 
interventions to target their full market potential through extraction and/or conservation, often without 
the participation of coastal dwellers (Choi 2017; Silver & Campbell 2018; Steinberg 2018; Steinberg 
& Kristoffersen 2018). 
 
While studies have examined the global rise of the blue economy, in this paper, we critically engage 
with blue economy discourse to examine how this global agenda unfolds in Southeast Asia and the 
Philippines in particular (see Childs & Hicks 2019; Choi 2017). We show that while there is a clear 
mandate to exploit and or conserve oceans for state and private sector interests, there is no clear 
consensus on what the blue economy means or attempts to pursue on the ground, or how it differs 
from previous coastal and marine program interventions. Unsurprisingly, variously positioned actors 
understand and engage with the notion in multiple ways (Silver et al. 2015; Voyer et al. 2018), 
shaping the blue economy agenda in whichever direction they prefer, with potential opportunities in 




































































reclamation, dispossession, and overexploitation (Brent et al. 2018a, 5). Recent research describes 
emerging blue economy discourse in terms of governing oceans as natural capital and good business 
(Silver et al. 2015). Others have shown how actors use these discourses to position knowledge 
production and facilitate economic development, and thereby create new ocean frontiers (Choi 2017; 
Steinberg & Kristoffersen 2018). Choi (2017) shows how China’s blue economy, for example, 
involves the state opening and claiming ocean territory as newly governable spaces for resource 
control and exploitation. Across polar, temperate, and equatorial oceans, others show how the notion 
of the blue economy is linked to national and regional sustainable development agendas that drive 
economic growth and resource accumulation (Childs & Hicks 2019; Steinberg & Kristoffersen 2018). 
 
In all of these cases, new knowledge, investments, and technologies render oceans as measurable, 
fixed entities that can be better controlled and managed for ‘blue growth’ that will somehow reconcile 
conservation and development in the context of coastal livelihood changes, struggles, and resistance. 
Building on this work, our paper critically examines how the blue economy is emerging discursively 
and in practice in the Southeast Asian region and the Philippines. We argue that blue economy actors 
in the Philippines seek to govern coastal and ocean spaces discursively and materially through 
processes of territorialisation for the purposes of generating and accounting for business opportunities 
and natural capital. We examine who benefits from blue economy policies and practices and how 
grassroots civil society responds in terms of existing and potential impacts for coastal dwellers and 
the environment. 
 
The Philippines is an archipelagic ocean nation, where millions of coastal dwellers directly depend on 
oceans as sources of livelihood, food security, and sociocultural well-being (Fig.1). In recent decades, 
civil society organisations, state agencies, and bilaterals have produced pioneering marine governance 
interventions, including: the development of marine protected areas (MPAs) (Alcala & Russ 2006; 
Maypa et al. 2012), co-management institutions (Pomeroy & Pido 1995) and ecosystem-based 




































































economy as the means to carry forward their programme agendas or directly resist what it represents 
and aims to do—questioning its political and economic logic and potential to marginalise coastal 
dwellers. 
 
This paper highlights what has been prioritised and questions what remains neglected, marginalised, 
and/or missing from current blue economy discourses and practices. Falling in line with discursive 
narratives linked to notions of oceans as good business and natural capital, we highlight how these 
discourses and practices produce new management entities and boundaries to enable governance 
interventions in Southeast Asia. In the Philippines, we examine how these discourses become 
entangled in national development and sustainability trajectories. We find that dominant blue 
economy narratives facilitate the transformation of ocean spaces in terms of business and capital, and 
the supporting territories that enable the privatisation of common property and/or common pool 
resources. We show that as the broader agenda starts to materialise in the form of projects, 
infrastructure, and coastal-marine territories, it intersects with coastal struggles over tenure, access, 
and user rights. Our analysis shows how current discursive constructions and potential material 
impacts may threaten coastal peoples’ use, access, and tenure rights. 
 
In developing our argument, we first introduce our use of a critical discourse analysis and provide an 
overview of the global configuration of oceans as economic frontiers. We then present a historical 
review of coastal marine governance approaches facilitating the blue economy agenda in Southeast 
Asia and the Philippines. Next, we analyse how the blue economy links with pre-existing discourses 
and practices and how these create new multilateral partnerships that enable the enclosure of ocean 
spaces that not only overlap with coastal dwellers tenure regimes, but also transcends with the 
territories of nation states. This involves engaging with networked actors and new ocean concepts that 
remove social justice dimensions and aim to transform ocean spaces into units, categories and 
enclosures (e.g., blue carbon, blue capital, and species units). Our analysis highlights the potential 
impacts these new territorialisation processes pose for coastal dwellers. We therefore call for the 




































































spaces. Such recognition requires that those who steer the blue economy politically foreground 
marginalised coastal actors’ struggles and resistance in national, regional, and local governance 
decision-making arenas. 
 
2. Methodological approach 
We draw on a mixed-methods approach involving discourse analysis and key informant interviews 
across regional, national and local scales in Southeast Asia and the Philippines. We define discourses 
as “(dominant) ideas, concepts and categorisations in a society that give meaning to reality and that 
shape the identities, interests, and preferences of individuals and groups” (Arts et al. 2010, 57). 
Discourses combine language, text, actions, beliefs, symbols, values, tools, and practices through 
social interactions where meaning is negotiated (Gee 2011; Widdowson 2004). As such, discourses 
bring together knowledge, power and language in “practices that systematically form the objects of 
which they speak” (Foucault 2002, 54). They therefore act to normalise certain ideas, beliefs and 
social practices in varied institutional settings (Arts & Buizer 2009). Yet, discourses also manifest 
materially (Montefrio & Dressler 2016). Ideas, beliefs, and practices draw financing and territorial 
demarcation, which further allocates and manages resources as they move across varied geographies 
(Satizábal & Dressler 2019). 
 
We conducted a critical discourse analysis of 363 documents, including agency reports, policies, and 
articles from bilaterals, multilaterals, government agencies, and civil society organisations. These 
documents are focused on the blue economy, coastal-marine governance frameworks, and 
management interventions in Southeast Asia and in the Philippines. The lead author also conducted 
semi-structured interviews (n = 35: academics (7); multilateral, and bilateral donors (5); national, 
provincial, and local governments (13); and civil society organisations1 (10)) across the same range of 
blue economy actors in the Philippines, from the regional to the local level, in Metro Manila and 
Palawan Province (i.e., covering Puerto Princesa City,¡ and the municipalities of Taytay and El Nido). 
                                                 
1 We use the term civil society organisation to encompass non-governmental organisations, people’s organisations and other 




































































Participant recruitment involved purposive, opportunistic, and snowball sampling that tried to cover 
the diversity of actors engaging with blue economy discourses. The interviews examined the changes 
and challenges in coastal/marine governance since the 1990s, as well as the meaning and emergence 
of blue economy discourse and practices—discussing key actors, fora, resources, benefits, impacts 
and policy implications. Interviews were conducted in English, Tagalog, and the local dialect called 
Cuyonon in Palawan, with translation support when necessary. We used NVivo software to code 
themes across different scales and generated a library of themes regarding: what is being discussed, 
where it is being discussed and where it will be applied; who participates and benefits; what/who is 
missing from the discussion; and what the implications are. We then grouped these themes into meta-
themes (e.g., marine governance, environmental protection, sustainable development, social and 
environmental justice) and created analytical clusters to code actors’ perspectives across scale, 
drawing on main blue economy challenges, motives, projects, events, financial mechanisms and 
constraints, as well as key actors and their policy frameworks (see Appendix 1). The analysis 
involved focusing on what and whose interests are being prioritised and what and who is excluded 
from blue economy governance discourses. 
 
3. Global context: The blue frontier 
Since the early 2000s, oceans have emerged as frontiers for investment in tangible and speculative 
commodities linked to carbon trading, resource extraction, ecosystem services, MPAs, and wildlife 
(Campbell et al. 2016; Corson et al. 2013). In parallel with the financialisaton of terrestrial resources 
in the green economy (MacDonald 2013), in the oceans, this shift has similarly emphasised the 
partitioning and measuring of marine ecosystems and resources in terms of units (e.g., monetary, 
carbon, stocks, capital, biomass, etc.) under the premise of valuing and ‘selling nature to save it’ 
(McAfee 1999). This transition largely responds to narratives of ‘oceans crisis’ that have restructured 
access to and control over marine ecosystems and resources through processes of territorialisation that 
aim to protect and maximise the ocean’s economic potential in ways that often ignore coastal fishers’ 
existing tenure, livelihoods, and management practices (Bennett et al. 2015; Franco et al. 2014; 




































































overlapping property rights and territories, new modes of resource extraction, finance and 
conservation, and contested knowledges and authority that drive commodification, accumulation and 
contestation over time (Vandergeest 2018). 
 
As Steinberg (2018) notes, ocean frontiers are spaces of both opening and closing; where new 
opportunities emerge, there are associated processes of enclosure. In parallel, state and non-state 
actors in the emerging blue economy create new opportunities by drawing on discursive and material 
practices to facilitate territorialisation and enclosure. As a discursive and material process, 
territorialisation encloses and controls spaces actively with agents “proscribing or prescribing specific 
activities within spatial boundaries” (Vandergeest & Peluso 1995, 388), who is included or excluded 
from these boundaries, and who can access what within and around them. In the blue economy, we 
show how actors at different scales render territory both discursively and materially through 
governance that further enables capital flows; that is, through ideas, policies, technologies, and 
practices that facilitate the territorialisation of oceans in ways that render complex marine spaces into 
legible, manageable, and bounded systems (often with new property rights) that enable economic 
opportunities (e.g., MPAs, fisheries and aquaculture, ecotourism, and infrastructure, etc.). 
Discursively forged territories emerge when a set of policy ideas and ideals become hardened, 
normative, and scripted, causing bureaucrats, managers, and fishers to align with certain political 
parameters. Each territory materially reflects financial flows, property rights, and other boundary 
demarcations that physically circumscribe and define ways to behave, what can and cannot be used, 
and who is included or excluded. The discursive and material work of territorial enclosure, entangles, 
and sometimes aligns a range of actors and practices to govern newly reconfigured material and social 
spaces (Steinberg 2018). Ultimately, as we show, the process of governing ocean territory in the blue 
economy amounts to strategic (re)ordering, regulation, and control over resources, and assigning 
meanings, values, and actions upon others (Elden 2010, 810). This requires the production of ocean 
knowledge to support management practices, inform new (legal and institutional) regulatory 
frameworks and maximise the ocean’s economic potential (Steinberg & Kristoffersen 2018). Drawing 




































































together to locate and tap the economic potential of marine resources for development under the 
premise of sustainability (Barbesgaard 2018). 
 
3.1. Old wine in new bottles? An emerging blue economy agenda 
After the Brundtland Report (1987) popularised and normalised the growth paradigm, sustainable 
development, a series of major, international events mainstreamed its discursive and practical 
applications. At the Rio Earth Summit, for example, Agenda 21 (1992) promoted the notion of public-
private partnerships as being central in the transition toward sustainable development. The World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development, a network of over 200 international companies, soon 
promoted the participation of businesses in global fora on sustainable development. So began the 
reconfiguration of nature in terms of good business (Sullivan 2017). 
 
Costanza et al. (1997) further facilitated the economistic framing of nature as natural capital in global 
institutions, think tanks and, eventually, governments, and civil society organisations. Globally, actors 
started speaking the language of natural capital and the green economy, particularly in terms of 
natural assets, stocks, and environmental services. Natural capital accounting initiatives soon 
proliferated, with the United Nations (UN) releasing the System of Environmental-Economic 
Accounting in 1993, which became the main framework for incorporating natural capital accounts as 
part of national macroeconomic indicators. In 2000, the UN Millennium Development Goals pushed 
for poverty reduction between 2000 and 2015, by integrating sustainable development into national 
policies (Target 7A), and for reducing biodiversity loss (Target 7B) through the expansion of MPAs 
and other territories (Horigue et al. 2012). These goals reinforced the idea of ‘win-win’ scenarios for 
delivering biodiversity conservation and poverty reduction (Adams & Hutton 2007). In 2006, The 
Nature Conservancy, the World Wildlife Fund and Stanford University launched the Natural Capital 
Project, advocating for natural capital as central to environmental protection (Fletcher et al. 2018), 
and, in 2007, the global initiative known as The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity was 
launched to “mak[e] nature’s values visible”, mainstreaming natural capital accounting into state and 




































































Sustainable Development (Rio+20), the financial sector released the Natural Capital Declaration, 
committing to integrate natural capital into financial products and services. 
 
Ocean natures and governance have only recently been reframed as natural capital and good business. 
Since Rio+20, the 2012 East Asian Seas Congress (in Changwon, Republic of Korea) and the 2013 
First World Oceans Summit (organised by The Economist) pushed for both themes to be incorporated 
into ocean governance under a blue economy frame: “a practical ocean-based economic model using 
green infrastructure and technologies, innovative financing mechanisms and proactive institutional 
arrangements for meeting the twin goals of protecting our oceans and coasts and enhancing its 
potential contribution to sustainable development, including improving human well-being, and 
reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities” (Changwon Declaration 2012). Purportedly 
pursuing blue growth through triple-win strategies, the 2012 Congress and 2013 Summit prompted 
investors to protect nature through new enclosures and market instruments to mitigate climate change 
and curb biodiversity loss, while creating business opportunities to foster economic and social 
benefits. Replacing the 2000 Millennium Development Goals in 2015, the Sustainable Development 
Goals further endorsed using public-private partnerships to meet various goals, including Goal 14, 
involving Life Below Water. As ocean natural capital soon emerged with prominence, the notion of 
‘blue carbon’ began circulating globally. Initially discussed at Rio+20, the carbon sequestration 
potential of marine ecosystems was framed as blue carbon, where the potential of carbon trading and 
other market schemes for climate change mitigation prevailed (Silver et al. 2015) and aligned with the 
Paris Agreement (UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2015). 
 
4. Regional blue economies 
Notions of doing good business and drawing on oceans as assets and natural capital predate the 
emergence of the blue economy in regional Southeast Asia and have laid the platform for national 
agencies and civil society organisations in different countries to engage blue economy ideals and 
agendas (Silver et al. 2015). Regionally, the blue economy unfolds in line with two, long-standing, 




































































ocean economies in terms of good business; and sustainability centring on using markets to support 
and facilitate biodiversity conservation, broadly in line with natural capital. In many respects, 
however, the blue economy reflects a continuation of previous ocean governance interventions—a 
rebranding that emphasises privatisation and marketisation processes, which capture further 
investment opportunities and outcomes (Cabral & Aliño 2011; Mansfield 2004; WFFP & WFF 2017). 
As one government official noted: “In principle it really is nothing new to us, […] we thought it is a 
good branding for what we are already doing” (No.22, July 31, 2018). It is these broader agendas and 
practices of the blue economy that influence regional initiatives and national agendas in the 
Philippines to ultimately facilitate alignment and territorial enclosure in ocean frontiers. 
 
4.1. Regional Blue business 
Insular Southeast Asia’s blue economy agenda was initially influenced by the Partnerships in 
Environmental Management for the Seas of East Asia (PEMSEA). Emerging in 1994 as a regional 
Integrated Coastal Management program under the Global Environment Facility and UN 
Development Programme, it has played a key role in facilitating the expansion of blue economy ideals 
and practices. PEMSEA has provided capacity-building training to plan and manage Integrated 
Coastal Management programmes, aiming to coordinate policy, management efforts and governance 
interventions directed towards the sustainable use of coastal marine ecosystems in the East Asian 
region (Shujog & PEMSEA 2015, 12). With a broad network of civil society organisations and state 
and private partners in 11 Southeast Asian countries, PEMSEA first publicly engaged the notion of 
the blue economy in a forum in 2011, calling for the scaling up of Integrated Coastal Management so 
as to build a blue economy agenda (Dongying Declaration). 
 
In line with PEMSEA, the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Centre has worked as an 
autonomous, intergovernmental body promoting fisheries development in Southeast Asia. In this 
sense, it supports and enables other regional partnerships with different local project interventions. 
For example, it has worked with the Coral Triangle Initiative (CTI) on Coral Reefs, Fisheries, and 




































































support of marine biodiversity conservation. The initiative was founded in 2007 and focuses on the 
sustainable management of marine resources in the Coral Triangle region through the protection of 
marine biodiversity and food security to mitigate climate change impacts. The Philippine government 
and the World Wildlife Fund hosted in 2010 the first CTI Regional Business Forum in Manila, where 
regional, private sector actors met to discuss the development of profitable and sustainable business 
opportunities. In 2013, under the explicit theme of A Marriage of Profit and Sustainability, the Forum 
linked business development to “help create a thriving and bustling blue economy for the Coral 
Triangle region” (CTI 2013). In the context of new partnerships, these actors reproduce and align with 
discourses of sustainability and business opportunities so as to focus on growing regional market 
demands for sustainable seafood (i.e., fishing companies and retailers), tourism and travel operators in 
specified regions (CTI 2014). Central to the CTI and its partners’ approach has been the expansion of 
territories that host both conservation and business enterprise in coastal and marine spaces (see 
below). 
 
Following PEMSEA and the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Centre, the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) supported a regional blue economy agenda since 2014.2 APEC’s 
Oceans and Fisheries Working Group argued that a blue economy approach could enhance economic 
growth through the sustainable development and conservation of marine resources by involving small 
and medium enterprises (Xiamen Declaration). In 2015, APEC developed the Iloilo Plan of Action, 
which positioned the blue economy as central to coastal food security and to fostering ‘inclusive’ 
economic growth (Vergel 2017). In accordance, PEMSEA released the Seas of East Asia Knowledge 
Bank platform and the East Asian Seas Sustainable Business Network to showcase and facilitate 
investment preparation and opportunities to build a blue economy through scaling up Integrated 
Coastal Management and supporting Coastal Resource Management Programmes in Southeast Asia 
and the Philippines (Nayanthara Gamage 2016). Similar to the CTI, these programmes aimed to 
                                                 
2 APEC’s Ocean and Fisheries Working Group is a regional economic forum for the discussion of ocean management and 
maritime security through task and working groups. It has facilitated policy reforms and regional programs to accelerate 




































































establish new territories such as marine protected areas with associated market opportunities linked to 
sustainability, including ecotourism and sustainable fisheries. In parallel, the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) implemented in 2015 the Oceans and Fisheries Partnership 
with bilaterals, the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Centre, and CTI to promote ecosystem-
based approach to fisheries management, relying on seafood traceability and ecolabelling/certification 
as strategies to monitor fisheries, labour, and gender dynamics at the coastal zone. This configuration 
of actors demonstrates how new financing ideas, technologies, and territories converge to work 
together across scale. 
 
Relying on private sector financing, new political actors, their networks, and business arenas have 
also aimed to support sustainable fisheries and supply chain management. Amongst these, in 2014, 
EKO Asset Management Partners, LLC, an investment management and advisory firm, released a 
report for the ‘Sustainable fisheries financing strategies: save the oceans feed the world project’.3 The 
EKO report notes that:“[…] actors seeking to protect ocean environments have increasingly turned to 
market-based policies and incentives to better align commercial and conservation objectives. These 
strategies have included certification schemes, the emergence of eco-brands, small investment funds, 
and consumer marketing efforts that generate greater demand for sustainably sourced seafood. Market 
principles also shape the use of rights-based fisheries management, or catch-share systems, which 
attempt to integrate property rights into fishing access as a way to incentivize better long-term 
resource stewardship.” 
 
Following the EKO’s recommendations, in 2014, the Bloomberg Family Foundation (Bloomberg 
Philanthropies)4 launched the Vibrant Oceans Initiative (Phase I US $53 million; Phase II (2018) US 
$86 million investment) establishing alliances with Oceana and Rare (an environmental NGO) to fund 
policy reforms and support the creation of stewardship programmes. This initiative worked with 
                                                 
3 See Sullivan (2013) for further discussion on EKO’s nature finance on terrestrial ecosystems. 





































































Encourage Capital (the combination of Wolfensohn Fund Management, L.P. and EKO) and The 
Rockefeller Foundation to develop private capital investment strategies (called blueprints) for 
delivering positive investment returns while supposedly improving local livelihoods and protecting or 
contributing to the restoration of marine resources (triple-win solutions) (Silver & Campbell 2018). 
Similarly, in 2018, the World Bank released the PROBLUE multi-donor trust fund (US $75 million) 
that promotes investments for economic growth in ocean frontiers by way of major infrastructure 
developments and governance within a blue economy framework. Relatively new to these networked 
partnerships is the strong presence of private sector finance influencing the broader blue economy 
vision toward new markets and economic growth as the basis for overcoming marine degradation and 
scarcity (see Corson et al., 2013). 
 
As blue growth and finance approaches for marine conservation emerge in the region, they all point to 
new investment funds for management and development priorities in ocean spaces. Indeed, there is 
now a shift from action planning to investment (PEMSEA 2017). We now see regional partnerships, 
private investors, and multi-donor funds engaging with oceans in terms of multiple economic 
opportunities and management structures that somehow safeguard resource sustainability through 
multisectoral agencies (Steinberg & Kristoffersen 2018). Given that these blue economy programs 
include most economic practices (World Bank 2016), it remains uncertain how such ocean 
development frameworks will navigate competing economic interests and how marginal coastal actors 
will benefit from finance-based interventions. 
 
4.2. Regional Natural Capitals 
Regionally, major international political alliances have supported the oceans as natural capital 
discourse(s) and have produced a range of accounting methodologies to translate scientific units and 
concepts directly into economic knowledge. First, the CTI helped establish MPA networks and 
ecosystem-based management in the Coral Triangle biodiversity area. Through ‘technical working 
groups’ made up of public (state agencies, NGOs, etc.) and private actors (development partners), this 




































































carbon projects and the economic valuation of marine resources in different protected areas in the 
region (Bover et al. 2011; De Castro et al. 2017; Silver et al. 2015). Second, the Blue Carbon 
Initiative was established in 2010 to serve as an international partnership (coordinated by 
Conservational International, the IUCN and the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) for developing 
management, financial, and policy mechanisms to conserve and restore marine ecosystems with high 
carbon sequestration. The Initiative created international Science and Policy working groups and 
aimed to provide science-based support for the significance of what became known as blue carbon 
ecosystems in climate change mitigation, as well as to integrate blue carbon into international policy 
frameworks. It also aimed to facilitate income generation from conserving and restoring blue carbon 
ecosystems by standardising carbon stock assessment methodologies for developing carbon markets 
and trading schemes. Finally, in 2010 the World Bank launched the Wealth Accounting and the 
Valuation of Ecosystem Services (WAVES) programme as a broader, global partnership to support the 
institutionalisation and implementation of national capital accounting using international standards. In 
2012, it received US $9.4 million as a multi-donor trust fund from eight development partners to 
mainstream natural capital into national policy in four countries, including the Philippines (World 
Bank 2018b, 67). Similar to the Blue Carbon Initiative, the WAVES alliance centred on standardising 
natural capital accounting methodologies to enable the emergence of carbon markets. Thus, the 
alliance mostly worked to build and align the capacity of government agencies with blue economy 
ideals. 
 
Based on the above, it is clear that multiple and overlapping alliances for blue carbon and natural 
capital are now being facilitated across Southeast Asia (Crooks et al. 2017), discursively aligning with 
an ostensive blue economy ideal that fosters economic growth, market expansion, and sustainability 
measures in ocean frontiers. Biophysical sciences and geospatial modelling are being used to translate 
fluid and dynamic ocean spaces into abstract static units, creating new representations and 
understandings of oceans. In facilitating new territorial configurations and using technical approaches 




































































marine tenure conflicts and equitable benefit distribution (Pomeroy & Courtney 2018). However, 
what do these blue economy initiatives mean in terms of tangible discursive and material impacts in 
coastal areas? Answering this question requires a closer look at how regional blue governance 
articulates with national oceans governance in the Philippines and how these initiatives may manifest 
at the local level. 
 
5. Emerging Philippine blue economies 
After the Marcos regime ended in 1986, the Philippines embarked on constitutional reforms that 
decentralised coastal resource management. Donor-assisted civil society organisations and 
government agencies supported Coastal Resource Management Programmes and the expansion of 
MPAs (White et al. 2005, 2002), with a strong focus on Local Government Units and the involvement 
of coastal communities (Local Government Code 1991, Republic Act 7160).5 This devolution of 
authority also involved the ideas and finances of various multilateral and bilateral donors (e.g., World 
Bank, USAID), environmental NGOs (e.g., Conservation International, World Wildlife Fund) and 
other civil society organisations (White et al. 2002). A signatory to the 1992 Earth Summit, Agenda 
21, the Philippines initially received considerable foreign aid and aligned with public-private 
‘partnerships’ to support the sustainable development of oceans, relying heavily on grassroots civil 
society organisations to reform policy and provide a labour force for implementing Coastal Resource 
Management Programmes (Austin 2003; Clarke 1993; Masud & Yontcheva 2005).6 
 
The Fisheries Code of 1998 (Republic Act 8550, amended by the 2015 Republic Act 10654) clarified 
and strengthened Local Government management roles. Moreover, it supported the use of an 
Integrated Coastal Management framework and no-take MPAs (along 15 percent (%) of municipal 
waters and 10% of coral reef areas) to which Coastal Resource Management Programmes and 
                                                 
5 These projects include: the Marine Conservation and Development Program (1984–1986) funded by USAID; the Fisheries 
Sector Program (1991–1997) funded by an Asian Development Bank loan; PEMSEA (1994–present) funded by the Global 
Environment Facility; The Coastal Resource Management Project (1996–2004); and the Fisheries Improved for Sustainable 
Harvests Project (2004–2010) funded by USAID (White et al. 2005). 
6 Over US $230 million were invested in coastal resource management between 1974–2000 (36 percent (%) government 




































































Integrated Coastal Management projects aligned (White et al 2005, 2006 — the basis of which came 
from USAID decades earlier and now from PEMSEA with a stronger market focus.7 These regional 
projects and political alliances have intersected in complex ways with the governance of Local 
Government Units, coastal-marine management territories, and intensifying patterns of fisheries 
production (Christie 2004; Christie et al. 2009; Eder 2005). 
 
5.1. National blue business 
Regional discourses of oceans as good business and natural capital have significantly influenced and 
aligned with national ocean governance agendas, manifesting in a nascent blue governance regime in 
the Philippines. When discussing oceans in terms of good business, state agencies, such as the 
National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), tend to include all marine economies as 
part of the blue economy, aligning with PEMSEA and the World Bank. In contrast, however, staff 
members from the Biodiversity Management Bureau, who are the CTI’s national focal point, argued 
that only economies supporting the sustainable use of marine resources should be included: “I would 
differentiate the [blue] economy to that which would be able to address the needs to ensure that 
marine resources continue to exist or will be conserved even as we try to generate revenues” (No. 22, 
July 31, 2018). 
 
While this focus on marine sustainability and biodiversity conservation was shared amongst many 
environmental civil society organisations, most state agencies aligned with exploiting ocean spaces 
for good business opportunities. The USAID’s Ecosystems Improved for Sustainable Fisheries project 
(ECOFISH, 2010–2017), for example, provided technical assistance to the national government’s aim 
of translating marine conservation plans into business plans in support of Local Government Units 
(USAID 2017, 6). As a staff member noted: “We translated management plans into actual [coastal] 
business plans. This means estimating and translating all the strategies into Pesos and Centavos, 
                                                 
7 PEMSEA defined Integrated Coastal Management or ICM as “A dynamic, multidisciplinary and iterative process to 
promote sustainable development and management of coastal areas. It covers a full cycle of information collection, planning, 




































































‘where are you going to get the money to do this’, ‘how much will it cost’, in the smallest details that 
we could.” (No.19, July 27, 2018). 
 
Achieving this has meant establishing stronger networks among civil society organisations, public 
agencies, and private sector entities that enable new cross-scale public-private partnerships with 
market-oriented solutions. Since 2016, for example, collaboration among the large tuna exporting 
company Meliomar Inc., the hotel chain Accord Group Hotels, and Greenpeace Philippines leveraged 
the Sustainable Seafood Week in Manila to discuss ways to make seafood sustainable, accessible and 
affordable for more Filipinos. Meliomar Inc., a Swiss-led seafood trading company founded in 2013, 
created alliances with Rare’s global fishery recovery program, receiving, in 2016, a US $1 million 
investment from the Meloy Fund for Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in Southeast Asia. The 
transition from solely focusing on seafood production to including sustainable consumption was also 
reinforced by The sustainable diner: A key ingredient of sustainable tourism project, launched in 2017 
by World Wildlife Fund and the Philippine Centre for Environmental Protection and Sustainable 
Development. Funded by the German government’s International Climate Initiative (€3,859,999), the 
project integrates sustainable production, consumption, and waste reduction, aiming to mitigate 
greenhouse gas emissions in the tourism sector. These initiatives reflect a rise in networked 
partnerships and a dramatic scaling up of financial value in seafood production under the notion of 
sustainability. 
 
Similarly, guided by the EKO and funded through the Bloomberg Family Foundation, the 2014 
Vibrant Oceans Initiative recently emerged as a potential blue economy blueprint for the Philippines. 
The Nexus Blue Partnership Strategy (Nexus Blue) served as one such blueprint, a hypothetical US 
$34 million public-private investment aiming to reform tuna fishery management (Markham et al. 
2016a). It emerged in response to the Philippines’ European Union ‘yellow card’ sanction in 2014, a 
warning for failing to comply with imported fish product traceability standards used against illegal, 
unreported, and unregulated fishing. Revoked a year later, this sanction would have reduced at least 




































































Republic Act 10554) to include higher penalties and law enforcement mechanisms (Lacsamana-
Umengan 2018). If implemented, Nexus Blue would support these changes, including the 
enforcement of maximum catch limits, improved traceability, fishery-wide vessel registration and 
infrastructure and operations improvements to the General Santos (in southern Mindanao) tuna trade, 
in accordance with European seafood market restrictions (Markham et al. 2016a). Reinforced by 
similar regional ideals, public-private business initiatives are core to the country’s blue economy 
discourses and practices, revealing how civil society and the private sector work together to manage 
and exploit ocean spaces for higher value production, irrespective of potential penalties. Ocean 
economies are thus conceived of as being central to increasing national economic development, 
growth, and security. As a former NEDA staff and academic consultant noted, the country’s ocean 
frontier must be exploited by both the state and private sector (see Angara 2019). The academic 
consultant stressed: “We have to be industrialised, we have to be an OECD [Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development] country, anything less in the presence of some of these 
‘interesting neighbours of ours’ is going to impact our national security [...] So, I would love for the 
conglomerates to develop the maritime sector, because if it is just poor fisherfolk, politically, this is 
the weakest part of our population, it is unfortunate, but it is our reality.” (No.16, July 25, 2018). 
 
Similarly, business discussions on regional and national scales about the blue economy remain 
focused on economic development. In slight contrast, environmental agencies promote sustainable 
development and biodiversity conservation but do so by drawing on particular marine economies 
(e.g., ecotourism, sustainable supply chains, and certification schemes). As explained by one staff 
member: “Moving towards a blue economy development is like having all these environmentally 
friendly enterprise developments and other industries that are not destructive of the environment; so, 
the basic principle behind all this is sustainable development.” (No.20, July 30, 2018). 
 
Given that Local Government Units are now being told to promote partnerships with private and 




































































2006)8, the devolution and development of such blue growth initiatives will unfold in certain coastal 
regions over others (e.g., where tourism already exists or is set to emerge). In a discursive and 
material sense, the Philippine blue economy only denotes elements that are economically valued and 
can be managed through territorial enclosures. In this way, the opening of the ocean frontier further 
intensifies state regulation and public-private investments, which grant private actors a central role in 
shaping how state oceans governance unfolds. 
 
5.2. National natural capitals 
Reconfiguring oceans as natural capital has been central to the blue economy agenda across almost all 
sectors, actors, and scales in the Philippines, and reflects both the discursive and material 
configuration of governance. In 2011, the Philippines joined one of the most prominent natural capital 
agendas, the Blue Carbon Initiative, to promote blue carbon projects nationally (Pangilinan 2017). 
Conservation International played an instrumental role in facilitating the initiative, particularly by 
organising meetings to support the development of alliances among academics, civil society 
organisations and donors to work on what is now known as blue carbon science. In turn, the 
Philippines component of the WAVES (US $0.7 million) programme unfolded from 2014–2017, 
aiming to provide technical and financial support to national, natural capital accounting efforts, 
focusing on mangroves, seagrasses and coral reefs. As a WAVES staff member noted, the program 
was government-oriented and worked with the NEDA, the Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources, the Philippine Statistics Authority, and Local Government Units on how to use accounting 
tools to benefit from blue carbon. Framing these agencies as economic managers of the environment, 
the WAVES initiative worked to build relationships and align carbon science with government needs. 
 
In 2013, the Capturing Coral Reef & Related Ecosystem Services project, funded by the Global 
Environment Facility, the World Bank and the University of Queensland, Australia, received US 
                                                 
8 Executive Order No. 533 was issued in 2006 and signed by former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to mandate that 
Integrated Coastal Management be adopted as a national strategy to ensure the sustainable development of the country’s 




































































$27.8 million to be implemented from 2013–2018 throughout the Philippines. Aligning with the CTI, 
the project involved working with local universities and state agencies to implement coastal projects. 
The project focused on providing technical assistance to governments for valuing ecosystem services, 
marine planning, business development and behaviour change amongst coastal dwellers, using the 
municipality of El Nido, Palawan, as a pilot site. It aimed to “unlock the natural wealth of coastlines 
in the East Asia-Pacific region, in order to enhance livelihoods and food security, improve community 
health and wellbeing, and sustain coastal ecosystems in the region” (CCRES 2014, 1). Working 
through the architecture of the 1998 El Nido-Taytay Managed Resource Protected Area (54,000 ha of 
marine waters, 36,000 ha of land), the project focused on developing technologies for marine 
planning: spatial tools to map fisheries, clarifying marine territories and estimates for mangroves and 
seagrass sedimentation; bioeconomic models to simulate different policy scenarios; and an 
ecosystem-based business development approach to promote local economic development (CCRES 
2018). The project outcome amounted to framing ecosystems in terms of business management — 
that is, natural capital as good business.9 Other major projects10 have continued to promote blue 
carbon agendas and alliances emerging and facilitating new technical interventions with more detailed 
oversight, measurement and governance of blue carbon ecosystems, aiming to shape coastal access to 
and use of marine resources. 
 
Such blue carbon branding hopes to draw business to the coastal zone. These blue carbon/capital 
discussions have prompted interest at the national and provincial levels in the development of market-
based financing mechanisms, including voluntary blue-carbon markets, National Appropriate 
Mitigation Actions, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation, and blue bonds 
(e.g., De Castro et al. 2017; PEMSEA 2017, 20). Although there are economic interests in developing 
coastal/marine payments for ecosystem schemes, these remain incipient and limited to the payment of 
                                                 
9 See website videos: https://ccres.net/videos/view/our-people-dr-maya-villaluz and https://ccres.net/videos/view/what-
makes-ccres-different. 
10 For example, the Comprehensive Assessment and Conservation of Blue Carbon Ecosystems and their Services in the 
Coral Triangle, BlueCARES and its Philippines counterpart project Integrated Assessment and Modelling of Blue Carbon 




































































tourist fees and fishing permits, with major infrastructure initiatives and private capital controlling 
most coastal development (Gevaña et al. 2018). The language and technicalities of blue carbon are 
thus central in enclosing and measuring the fluid dynamics of oceans and coastal peoples. 
 
While contrasting policy agendas and practices exist in the blue economy realm, most are entangled in 
a pervasive and powerful blue growth narrative. Here, blue growth explicitly encompasses good 
business and natural capital interventions at the national and subnational levels (Azanza 2017). In this 
context, then, it is unclear how coastal dwellers will be integrated into program interventions, who 
will benefit, and how benefits will be more equitably distributed in complex community settings. The 
crucial question, therefore, arises: For whom is the blue economy? 
 
6. Blue economy for whom? Civil society organisation responses from below 
Regional and national actors have been remarkably consistent in espousing a narrative of how 
business ventures, markets, and natural capital accounting can yield blue growth. In this actor-
network, however, many grassroots civil society organisations suggest that the pro-growth narrative 
has paid limited attention to the rights and livelihoods of coastal dwellers. Many civil society 
organisations suggest that blue carbon-related livelihood support had yet to materialise, others 
rejected the concept for fear of coastal peoples losing rights, and others were undecided on the merits 
of the broader vision. As a civil society organisation staff member explained: “…. we are worried 
about exploiting or maximising the marine resources, because what we are really after [is] 
rehabilitation and sustainable use.” (No.21, July 30, 2018). Several representatives also cautioned 
that the notion of a blue economy would facilitate the expansion and further intensification of tourism, 
commercial fishing, MPAs and other marine economies. Given the limited participation these groups 
had in good business and natural capital projects, some stressed that intensifying economic activity 
would only further marginalise coastal dwellers. 
 
More radical civil society organisations completely opposed the blue economy agenda, suggesting it 




































































critical of the blue economy’s financial investments in valuing ecosystem services, rather than 
actually supporting ecosystem protection. When reflecting on the relevance of valuing interventions 
(e.g., WAVES), the staff member mentioned: “Too much money is being invested in valuing 
ecosystems that we already know are valuable. Do you think anyone has doubts that coral reefs are 
valuable? We could be using this money to actually protect these ecosystems and their users.” (No.9, 
August 3, 2018). Similarly, Pamalakaya, the National Federation of Small Fisherfolk Organisations 
(also part of the World Forum of Fisher Peoples) explicitly opposed the blue economy agenda, 
claiming it supports foreign interests: “The blue economy will continue and further intensify the 
policies of liberalisation and privatisation in our marine resources. These are policies of foreign 
plunder!” (No.75, November 6, 2018) Pamalakaya has contested coastal territorialisation processes, 
such as reclamation projects (i.e., creating new land from coastal-marine spaces linked to oil 
exploration, large-scale infrastructure) and marine tourism development. Citing displacement of 
coastal dwellers, Pamalakaya campaigned against the Leyte Tide Embankment Project, a 27.3 km 
long seawall enclosure aiming to protect coastal communities in Leyte from storm surges similar to 
those of Super Typhoon Haiyan. In 2017, Pamalakaya, Greenpeace, World Wildlife Fund, and Save 
Philippines Seas also campaigned against an underwater Nickelodeon tourism infrastructure theme 
park in Palawan. The campaign won and the theme park was subsequently cancelled. Such campaigns 
entail considerable risk. In the past two years, six members of Pamalakaya actively campaigning 
against reclamation projects have been murdered. As infrastructure development intensifies, so too 
does the potential harassment of activists and other members of civil society organisations. 
 
Grassroots organisations’ concerns involve protecting the coastal spaces in which marginalised 
groups reside (and typically have little to no formal, tenurial claim over oceans and coastal areas) 
from further encroachment by intensifying reclamation projects, for-profit initiatives and even marine 
protected areas. Their concerns are well founded. For instance, President Duterte’s Build, Build, Build 
program (US $158 billion, from 2018–2023) for infrastructure development also encompasses 
reclamation projects in both coastal and marine areas. These initiatives draw heavily on national 




































































obscuring the need to account for past and present social dimensions, political economies, and coastal 
rights in poverty alleviation. In this context, the very real potential for sustained ocean grabbing 
emerges at the expense of the rights of coastal dwellers (Bennett et al. 2015). However, the prospect 
of countering the impacts of ocean grabbing, and other negative aspects of blue growth, remains 
constrained by declining funds and short project lifespans (~5 years) that pay staff and partly enable 
them to act. All grassroots organisations interviewed claimed they experience funding shortages that 
force them to volunteer for months at a time to support their organisations’ agendas, revealing the 
dependency they have on donor funding and larger organisations that ultimately fund the very blue 
economy projects they resist. 
 
Yet grassroots organisations have also harnessed the blue economy agenda to mobilise international 
support by leveraging ‘blue justice’—justice at sea, in the context of regional fora and international 
meetings. In October 2018, during the 3rd World Small-Scale Fisheries Congress held in Chiang Mai, 
Thailand, community leaders and scientists called for a broader mobilisation in pursuit of blue justice, 
to connect people to oceans and to address the impacts that blue growth agendas have on coastal 
dwellers’ livelihoods and rights. Participants discussed the meaning and importance of blue justice, 
questioning how to pursue social and distributive justice, human rights, gender equality, and food 
security among coastal dwellers in the context of maritime extractive sectors (fisheries, mining, 
infrastructure, etc.) (TBTI 2018). Distancing themselves from the blue economy agenda, many 
grassroot organisations including small-scale fishers instead increasingly focus on food sovereignty 
and blue justice as alternatives (KNTI & WFFP 2017; WFFP 2018). 
 
7. Discussion and conclusion  
After decades of civil society and academic scrutiny over the emergence of the green economy and its 
entanglement with market-oriented governance, capital and extractivism (Corson et al. 2013), similar 
agendas and practices have emerged in the realm of the ‘blue’—that is, ocean frontiers (Barbesgaard 
2018; Bennett et al. 2019). In Southeast Asia, the rise of the blue economy aligns with a pervasive 




































































driving the blue economy, or simply blue growth, have facilitated new forms of political and 
economic investments in ocean frontiers, generating (tangible and intangible) commodities and 
finance linked to carbon trading, marine territories, reclamation, resource extraction, and tourism 
expansion. The blue economy has thus gone well beyond ‘selling nature to save it’ (McAfee 1999), 
establishing discursive and material territories (from MPAs, tourism infrastructure or seawalls) that 
enable capital expansion with few or limited social and ecological safeguards (see also Silver & 
Campbell 2018). 
 
Blue economy discourses and practices have facilitated an emerging ‘blue growth’ ideal that stabilises 
and leverages an economistic rationale as the means of securing social and environmental benefits—a 
triple-win scenario. Rendering technical or simply neglecting the social complexity of oceans, the 
emerging blue economy narrative foregrounds economic practices for governing access to and control 
over coastal and marine spaces (Bennett 2019; Li 2007). Indeed, blue economy agendas have emerged 
discursively and materially as good business and natural capital, as they align with broader growth 
ideals and enclosures along coasts and in oceans. Regionally and nationally, multilateral and state 
institutional alliances have actively drawn on oceans as good business, bringing together public and 
private sector actors pushing for new coastal-marine economies and territories. Considering the long-
standing inequalities that have shaped coastal and marine political economies in the region (Eder & 
Evangelista 2014; Nevins & Peluso 2008), it is unclear who will guarantee environmental and social 
safeguards. Crucially, good business ideals and natural capital ventures intersect to accelerate the 
realignment of ocean governance in terms of the economic valuation of coastal and marine 
ecosystems. It is here that the rhetoric of blue carbon intersects with and drives coastal enclosures, 
markets, and capital. 
 
Broadly, blue economy actors frame social and ecological benefits in economistic ways, which 
narrow the spectrum of potential alternatives to intensifying economic growth and development in 
coastal areas. The blue economy paradigm reflects further investments in market-expansion, resource 




































































potential for displacing coastal dwellers and their fishing grounds, as well as degrading marine 
ecosystems. New political and economic alliances are being leveraged, allowing powerful, private and 
public sector actors to influence government policy agendas (Mallin et al. 2019). For instance, 
Executive Order No. 74 has transferred the power to approve reclamation projects from NEDA to the 
Philippine Reclamation Authority which is under the Office of President Rodrigo Duterte. This 
transition from state-driven coastal governance to devolved partnerships has enabled actors in both 
sectors to strengthen their networks and relationships with larger civil society organisations, state 
agencies, and Local Government Units, shaping governance interventions in line with economic 
interests (Campling & Havice 2018). As the discourse and narrative of the blue economy gradually 
stabilises among dominant actors across scale, sustained investments in the promise of blue growth, 
technical interventions, and marine territories may ultimately depoliticise complex coastal problems 
and struggles (Ferguson 1990; Li 2007). Although blue development and sustainability discourses and 
practices may vary and contradict each other, they typically constitute one another as expanding 
markets and capital through the ocean governance strategies in coastal settings (Li 2011). These 
discourses and practices thus require critical scrutiny. They not only enforce particular meanings and 
understandings of oceans, but also materialise in ocean frontiers, shaping policies and management 
practices with real implications for coastal peoples and marine ecosystems (Arts & Buizer 2009). 
 
As shown, few upper level blue economy policies and projects factor in coastal use rights and varied 
livelihoods and many grassroots civil society organisations remain at odds with the broader vision. In 
the Philippines, fisher organisations have quickly identified the problematic aspects of the blue 
economy, critically questioning the blue growth rhetoric, advocating for greater participation of small-
scale fishers, indigenous peoples, and women in coastal and marine governance. Yet, coastal dwellers 
and networked civil society organisations have also drawn on blue economy discourses to progress 
their own social movements for equity and dignity in the region’s seascapes. Joining the global food 
sovereignty movement, for example, the World Forum of Fisher Peoples has progressed the notion of 
blue justice as a counter-discourse, responding to the increasing encroachment of public and private 




































































ensure a sovereign right to food systems, not only in terms of access and production, but also in 
relation to shared histories, heritage, territory, and capacities (see the World Forum of Fisher Peoples’ 
food sovereignty six pillars, KNTI & WFFP 2017, 3–4). 11 This requires the development of strategies 
to support the financial independence of grassroots civil society organisations, particularly given their 
role in defending coastal livelihoods and ecologies. 
 
In sum, the ‘blue economy’ reflects a process of governing coastal and marine spaces through 
discursive and material territorialisation, wherein new partnerships between public and private sector 
actors forge networks, boundaries and management practices. In a manner similar to ‘green economy’ 
practices, blue economy actors and the partnerships emerging between financial institutions, bilaterals 
and conservation organisations align sustainability ideals with new business opportunities, producing 
abstract knowledge and practices (financing ideas, technologies, territories) that reorder and rebrand 
oceans as territories with economic potential. The blue economy agenda will thus likely do more to 
promote extraction and development in oceans through processes of territorialisation than foster 
environmental sustainability and safeguard the rights of coastal dwellers. The cross-scale power 
dimensions that shape regional, national, and subnational political and economic partnerships ensure 
that coastal dwellers remain peripheral to blue governance interventions. Given the history of social 
movements in the Philippines, participatory processes that support blue justice still have considerable 
potential to address equity and inequality through redistribution and guarantees of well-being among 
coastal dwellers (Leach et al. 2018). Achieving this goal in changing political climates will require 
that civil society organizations be funded and free to carry out the critical work of empowering coastal 
dwellers in contested marine spaces, as well as developing accountability mechanisms for socio-
environmental injustices. The current blue economy agenda, therefore, must open political and 
economic spaces that enable coastal dwellers to legitimately express and defend their needs and 
desires, as ocean frontiers fill with development and degradation.  
                                                 
11 Another example is the Slow Fish movement, which has started to oppose the blue growth rhetoric, fostering 
awareness about the importance of fishers as custodians of oceans and resisting the privatisation and enclosure 
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